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1 Introduction
Fairness and efficiency are two criteria often adhered to by policy makers, arbitrators
settling disputes, managers deciding on compensation packages, and feature constantly
in economic and social debates. These properties were first studied in a complete in-
formation setting. In economic environments, prominent solution concepts include the
notions of fair outcomes, which are both efficient and envy-free (Foley, 1967, and Varian,
1974), and egalitarian equivalent allocations (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978).1
In many applications, agents already hold private information at the time of selecting
an outcome. The role of information is indeed one of the central topics in economics since
the end of the sixties. However, most effort has been devoted to understanding what is
achievable in the presence of informational constraints2 and trying to find feasible mech-
anisms that maximize the revenue of an agent.3 Few papers discuss and apply criteria
to select a socially appealing incentive compatible mechanism (some related literature is
discussed towards the end of this introduction).
In this paper, we extend the egalitarian principle captured by the concept of egali-
tarian equivalence to pure exchange economies with asymmetric information. An alloca-
tion is egalitarian equivalent in an economy with complete information (see Pazner and
Schmeidler, 1978) with respect to a reference bundle if all agents are indifferent between
the proposed allocation and a common bundle that is proportional to the reference bun-
dle. That is, measuring the agents’ surplus in terms of the reference bundle, all obtain
the same surplus. In a similar spirit, we say that a mechanism is interim egalitarian
equivalent if all the agents are indifferent, in expected terms given their private informa-
tion, between the proposed mechanism and receiving a fixed proportion of the reference
bundle, in each possible profile of types.4
Under complete information, egalitarian equivalent allocations that are also (ex-post)
Pareto efficient always exist. Under asymmetric information, efficiency requires to take
into account both the gains from insurance and the agents’ incentives to possibly mis-
represent their information. This idea is captured by the notion of interim incentive
efficiency defined by Holmström and Myerson (1983). Our main result (Proposition 6)
states that mechanisms that are both interim egalitarian equivalent and interim incentive
efficient also exist in economies where the social planner or the society as a whole can
1Other attempts to capture fairness and efficiency in the theory of social choice include the maxi-
mization of social welfare orderings, such as the egalitarian minimum, the utilitarian sum, or the Nash
product. A major difference compared to the notions of envy-freeness and egalitarian equivalence, is
that utilities must have some cardinal content in order to escape impossibility results of the kind first
proved by Arrow. Efficiency and fairness are also of great concern in the theory of cooperative games.
A prominent example of such concern is given by the Shapley value for characteristic functions with
transferable utilities and its various extensions to more general environments (see McLean, 2002, for a
survey).
2The revelation principles (Gibbard, 1973, Green and Laffont, 1977, and Myerson, 1979) have been a
powerful tool in this task.
3See, for instance, the development of auctions, contract theory, or the principal-agent literature.
4Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2006) use the ideas behind the concept of egalitarian equivalence to
propose an ordinal Shapley value for economic environments.
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implement any feasible allocation rule5 via an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for
instance, in the case of Postlewaite and Schmeidler’s (1986) non-exclusive information -
see Corollary 9). When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the
two criteria may become incompatible. This is somehow reminiscent of the incompati-
bility between concepts of equity and efficiency under complete information in economic
environments that are more general than classical pure exchange economies (see Pazner
and Schmeidler, 1974, and Maniquet, 1999).
We now briefly discuss some related literature. Mirrlees (1971) is a first classic paper
where a social choice criterion is applied under asymmetric information to select a de-
sirable incentive compatible mechanism. The social objective he follows is to maximize
the sum of the agents’ utilities (or a common transformation of those utilities), in the
utilitarian tradition. His methodology has been followed since then in the literature on
optimal taxation. In most papers, there is a large population, which implies that all
possible types (representing, for instance, the agents’ productivity or their cost of effort)
are present in the population. Another classic paper where a utilitarian principle is ap-
plied to select an incentive compatible mechanism is Myerson and Satterthwaite’s (1983)
bilateral trade problem. Here, only two agents are interacting and only one pair of types
(interpreted as reservation prices) is actually realized. The utilitarian criterion is applied
ex-ante, i.e. behind the veil of ignorance and using the relative likelihood of each possible
pair of types. There is a more recent literature that is developing at the intersection of
computer science and economics that looks for strategy-proof mechanisms that maximize
a worst-case scenario index, in order to guarantee, for instance, a minimal percentage of
the maximal total surplus in every possible realization of the types (see e.g. Guo and
Conitzer, 2009, Moulin, 2009, and references therein). Surprisingly, there are almost no
papers that propose axiomatic discussions of social choice criteria under incomplete in-
formation. The only published paper that we are aware of is Nehring (2004) who proves
that ex-ante utilitarianism is the only interim social welfare ordering that is both consis-
tent with interim Pareto comparisons and that extends the ex-post utilitarian criterion.6
de Clippel (2010a) shows that his approach cannot be used to extend any other classical
social welfare ordering from the ex-post to the interim stage. de Clippel (2010b) follows
a different methodology — trying to characterize a social welfare function that satisfies
extensions of Kalai’s (1977, Theorem 1) axioms — to obtain a notion of egalitarianism
under incomplete information. The solution discussed in the present paper can be seen as
an adaptation of this criterion to economic environments with the objective of avoiding
interpersonal comparisons of utilities.
In the next section, we present the framework and the classical definitions while, in
Section 3, we introduce the notion of interim egalitarian equivalence. In Section 4 we
5A feasible allocation rule determines a feasible way of sharing the total endowment of the economy
for each type profile that comes with a strictly positive probability.
6The axiomatic results in the theories of bargaining and social choice share some common features
under complete information, the Nash product being also a natural social welfare ordering, for instance.
While it is still unclear whether these similitudes survive the presence of asymmetric information, it is
worth mentioning that there are some partial axiomatic results that extend Nash’s (1950) bargaining
theory (see Harsanyi and Selten, 1972; Myerson, 1984; Weidner, 1992).
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prove our existence and uniqueness result and, in Section 5, we present an economic ex-
ample that further illustrates our concept and shows that interim egalitarian equivalence
and interim incentive efficiency may be incompatible in the presence of exclusive infor-
mation. Finally, in Section 6, we highlight additional properties of the solution, suggest
a weaker concept for those economies where interim egalitarian equivalent and interim
incentive efficient mechanisms do not exist, and further discuss our approach.
2 The Framework and Standard Definitions
An economy is a 6-tuple
(N,L, (Ti)i∈N , π, e, (ui)i∈N),
where N is the set of agents, L is the set of goods, Ti is agent i’s set of possible types,
π ∈ ∆(T ) (T = ×i∈NTi) is the common prior describing the relative probability of the
types, e ∈ RL+ \ {0} is the aggregate endowment of the economy in each possible state t,
and ui : RL×T → R is a concave, continuous and strongly increasing utility function that
represents the preferences of agent i (lotteries are evaluated according to the expected
utility criterion). For notational convenience, we also denote by N , L and T the number
of elements in the corresponding sets. We assume without loss of generality that each
type of each agent comes with a strictly positive probability, i.e. for all ti ∈ Ti and all
i ∈ N there exists t−i such that π(ti, t−i) > 0.
Since types are private information, it may be profitable for the agents to communicate
before agreeing on an allocation. Formalizing this idea, a mechanism is a function μ :
×i∈NMi → RL×N , where Mi is any finite set of “messages.” Agents are assumed to
play a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the game induced by the mechanism. The revelation
principle (Myerson, 1979) allows us, without loss of generality, to restrict attention to
direct mechanisms (i.e. Mi = Ti, for each i ∈ N) for which truth-telling forms a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium, that is mechanisms that are incentive compatible. To formally define
this property, note that if all the other agents report their types truthfully, then agent i’s
expected utility when reporting t0i in the direct mechanism μ, while being of type ti, is
Ui(μ, t0i|ti) =
X
t−i∈T−i
π(t−i|ti)ui(μi(t0i, t−i), t),
where π(t−i|ti) denotes the conditional probability of t−i given ti. For simplicity, we will
write Ui(μ|ti) instead of Ui(μ, ti|ti). The mechanism μ is incentive compatible if
Ui(μ|ti) ≥ Ui(μ, t0i|ti)
for each ti, t0i in Ti and each i ∈ N . A mechanism μ is incentive feasible if it is incentive
compatible and feasible, that is
P
i∈N μi(t) ≤ e, for all t ∈ T .
Efficiency is a prerequisite for any cooperative solution. Its content was first for-
malized under incomplete information by Holmström and Myerson (1983). An incentive
compatible mechanism μ0 interim Pareto dominates an incentive compatible mechanism
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μ if Ui(μ0|ti) ≥ Ui(μ|ti) for all ti ∈ Ti and all i ∈ N , with at least one of the inequalities
being strict. A mechanism is interim incentive efficient if it is incentive feasible, and it
is not interim Pareto dominated by any other incentive feasible mechanism.
3 Interim Egalitarian Equivalence
Efficiency is a necessary condition for a cooperative solution to be appealing, but it is
not sufficient, as it remains silent regarding the distribution of the gains derived from
cooperation. Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) made an interesting proposal to select a
subset of Pareto efficient allocations under complete information, i.e. when the type sets
are singletons. In order to obtain a solution that depends only on the ordinal information
encoded in the agents’ preferences, they proposed to measure cooperative gains in the
space of goods following the direction given by a reference bundle d ∈ RL+ \{0}. For each
allocation a ∈ RL×N+ and each agent i, let λai be the real number defined by the following
equation:7
ui(ai) = ui(λai d).
The allocation a is egalitarian equivalent (along d) if λai = λ
a
j for all i, j ∈ N . Pazner and
Schmeidler proposed to restrict attention to those allocations that are Pareto efficient
and egalitarian equivalent, and prove existence and uniqueness under mild assumptions.
The purpose of our paper is to extend Pazner and Schmeidler’s solution to environ-
ments with incomplete information (for any finite set Ti, i = 1, . . . , n), and study its
properties. One may be tempted to simply look for the mechanism that associates to
each t a Pareto efficient egalitarian equivalent allocation in that ex-post economy. This
way to proceed is wrong for at least two reasons. First, that mechanism need not be
incentive compatible, and thereby impossible to implement in practice. Second, it does
not exploit the possibility of mutually beneficial insurance. In other words, it would be
incompatible with interim incentive efficiency in most economies. Agents know only their
own type when choosing the mechanism. The solution concept should thus be based on
their preferences at that point in time (interim, and not ex-post). Let d ∈ RL+ \ {0} be
the reference vector.8 For each incentive compatible mechanism μ and each type ti of
each agent i, let λμi (ti) be the real number defined by the following equation:
Ui(μ|ti) = Ui(λμi (ti)d|ti).
This means that agent i of type ti is indifferent between participating to the mechanism
μ and receiving the fixed proportion λμi (ti) of the bundle d in each possible type profile
(for the other agents). We propose a criterion according to which an incentive feasible
mechanism μ is “equitable” if, at any possible interim event, all the agents obtain the
same (interim) gains (as measured along the vector d).
7We omit the vector t of types in the equation, since it is assumed to be common knowledge in this
paragraph.
8The definitions and the results obtained in this paper extend to the case where d varies with t, at
the cost of heavier notations.
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Definition 1 An incentive compatible mechanism μ is interim egalitarian equivalent if,
for all t ∈ T with π(t) > 0, we have: λμi (ti) = λ
μ
j (tj) for all i, j ∈ N .
The next section is devoted to the study of interim incentive equitable mechanisms,
defined as follows:
Definition 2 A mechanism is interim incentive equitable (IIE) if it is both interim
egalitarian equivalent and interim incentive efficient.
4 Sufficient Condition for the Existence and Unique-
ness of IIE Mechanisms
We start by establishing the existence and essential uniqueness of IIE mechanisms in
environments where the incentive constraints are not really restricting what the social
planner or the society as a whole can implement. We need two new definitions and a
lemma before stating and proving this result formally.
Definition 3 A non-empty subset B ⊂ T is common knowledge if π(ti, tˆ−i) = 0, for all
i ∈ N , and all (ti, tˆ−i) ∈ T \B for which there exists t−i ∈ T−i such that t ∈ B.
Definition 4 Let Tˆ be the support of π. An allocation rule is a function a : Tˆ → RL×N+ .
It is feasible if
P
i∈N ai(t) ≤ e, for all t ∈ Tˆ . For each i ∈ N and each ti ∈ Ti,
Ui(a|ti) will denote agent i’s expected utility when of type ti, should the allocation rule a
be implemented truthfully:
Ui(a|ti) =
X
t−i∈T−i s.t. t∈Tˆ
π(t−i|ti)ui(ai(t), t).
Lemma 5 Let t∗ ∈ Tˆ and let B(t∗) be the minimal common knowledge event that con-
tains t∗. Then, for any t ∈ B(t∗), there exists a finite sequence (ts)Ss=1 in Tˆ that starts at
t∗ and ends at t, such that, for all s ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1}, there exists j ∈ N for which ts+1j
= tsj.
Proof. Let B be the set of t ∈ Tˆ for which there exists a finite sequence (ts)Ss=1 in Tˆ that
starts at t∗ and ends at t, and such that, for all s ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1}, there exists j ∈ N
for which ts+1j = t
s
j. It is straightforward to check that B is a common knowledge event,
and hence B(t∗) ⊆ B, which concludes the proof.
Proposition 6 Let (N,L, (Ti)i∈N , π, e, (ui)i∈N) be an economy such that, for any feasible
allocation rule a, there exists an incentive feasible mechanism μ such that
Ui(μ|ti) = Ui(a|ti),
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for all ti ∈ Ti and all i ∈ N . Then an IIE mechanism exists. In addition, agents are
indifferent between any two IIE mechanisms. In particular, if Ui(·|ti) is strictly concave,
for each i ∈ N and each ti ∈ Ti, then there exists a unique IIE mechanism.9
Proof. Denote by B the set of minimal common knowledge events for π. For each B ∈ B,
define:
λB = max {λ|∃ feasible allocation rule a s.t. Ui (a|ti) = Ui(λd|ti) for all i ∈ N, t ∈ B} .
Such a λB exists because the set on the right-hand side is nonempty (for instance, a = 0
is a feasible allocation rule), bounded from above (because it is impossible to sustain
unbounded levels of utility), and closed (because utility functions are continuous). Let
aB be a feasible allocation rule such that Ui (aB|ti) = Ui(λBd|ti) for all i ∈ N and all
t ∈ B, and let a∗ be the allocation rule defined as follows:
a∗(t) = aB(t)(t),
for each t ∈ Tˆ , where B(t) is the minimal common knowledge event that contains t.
Finally, following the assumption of this proposition, let μ be an incentive feasible mech-
anism that gives the same interim utility to all the agents of all types as the allocation
rule a∗. We conclude the first part of this proof by showing that μ is an IIE mechanism.
By construction, λμi (ti) = λ
μ
j (tj) for all i, j ∈ N and all t ∈ Tˆ , and hence we need only
check that μ is interim incentive efficient. Suppose on the contrary that there exists an
incentive feasible mechanism ν that interim Pareto dominates μ, i.e. Ui(ν|ti) ≥ Ui(μ|ti),
for all ti ∈ Ti and all i ∈ N , with at least one of the inequalities being strict. Sup-
pose for instance that Uj(ν|t¯j) > Uj(μ|t¯j). Let also t¯−j ∈ T−j be such that t¯ ∈ Tˆ and
uj(νj(t¯), t¯) > uj(μj(t¯), t¯). The mechanism ν restricted to Tˆ can be thought of as an allo-
cation rule. Let us modify it to construct a new allocation rule a0 as follows. At least one
of the components of νj(t¯), let’s say l, is strictly positive, because uj(νj(t¯), t¯) > uj(0, t¯).
Let then a0j(t¯) be the bundle obtained by decreasing νlj(t¯) by a small amount ε, while
keeping the other components constant. For each i ∈ N \ {j}, let a0i(t¯) be the bundle
obtained by increasing νli(t) by ε/n − 1, while keeping the other components constant.
Finally, for all t ∈ Tˆ \ {t¯} and all i ∈ N , let a0i(t) = νi(t). If ε > 0 is small enough, then
Ui(a0i|t¯i) > Ui(μ|t¯i), for all i ∈ N , and Ui(a0i|ti) ≥ Ui(μ|ti), for all ti ∈ Ti and all i ∈ N . We
can now use any type of any agent who is strictly better off under the new allocation rule
to improve yet other types of other agents by further modifying the previous allocation
rule in the same manner. By Lemma 5, repeating the argument finitely many times, one
can derive a feasible allocation rule that gives higher interim utilities to all agents than
a∗ over B(t¯), thereby contradicting the maximality of λB(t¯). Hence μ is in fact interim
incentive efficient, and hence IIE.
Let us now focus on the essential uniqueness of IIE mechanisms. Let μ and ν be two
IIE mechanisms. Using the notations from the first part of the proof, it must necessarily
9More precisely, any two IIE mechanism coincide on Tˆ , since the definition of a mechanism over type
profiles that come with a zero probability is irrelevant.
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be the case that λμB = λ
ν
B, for all minimal common knowledge eventB. Indeed, suppose on
the contrary that there exists a minimal common knowledge event B such that λμB > λ
ν
B.
Then the mechanism ν 0 that is equal to ν on T \B and to μ on B is incentive feasible and
Pareto dominates ν, thereby contradicting the fact that ν is interim incentive efficient.
Hence, indeed, λμB = λ
ν
B, for all minimal common knowledge event B, and agents are
indifferent between any two IIE mechanisms. Suppose now, in addition, that Ui(·|ti) is
strictly convex, for each i ∈ N and each ti ∈ Ti. For every t ∈ Tˆ , let a(t) = μ(t)+ν(t)2 .
The allocation rule a is feasible and, given the strict concavity of the utility functions, it
interim Pareto dominates both μ and ν. Indeed, Ui(a|ti) ≥ Ui(μ|ti) since
Ui(a|ti) = Ui(μ+ ν
2
|ti) ≥ 1
2
[Ui(μ|ti) + Ui(ν|ti)] = Ui(μ|ti),
for each ti ∈ Ti and all i ∈ N . Moreover, if μ and ν are distinct, then at least one of
the inequalities is strict. The assumption of the proposition would then imply that one
can construct an incentive feasible mechanism that interim Pareto dominates μ, thereby
contradicting its interim incentive efficiency. We must thus conclude that μ(t) = ν(t) on
Tˆ .
Remark 7 It is clear from the proof that the λ’s associated to all agents of all types must
coincide over minimal common knowledge events B, that is, λμi (ti) = λ
μ
j (tj) for all t ∈ B
and i, j ∈ N , if μ is an IIE mechanism and B is a minimal common knowledge event.
However, the gains that agents obtain can vary across more general events. An obvious
illustration of this phenomenon is given by the special case of complete information, where
Tˆ is “diagonal” or, equivalently, each profile of types in Tˆ is uniquely determined by
any of its components. Corollary 9 below will show that Proposition 6 applies in this
case, although it should be clear already that the IIE mechanisms will coincide on Tˆ with
Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) egalitarian equivalent allocations in the corresponding ex-
post economies. Hence, indeed, for any given t ∈ Tˆ , we will have λμi (ti) = λ
μ
j (tj) over
all agents i and j at an IIE mechanism μ, but this common factor λ will often vary with
t ∈ Tˆ .
Non-exclusive information, as first defined by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986),
provides a natural class of information structures for which the assumption of Proposition
6 is automatically satisfied.
Definition 8 The agents in an economy have non-exclusive information (NEI) if, for
any agent i and any t−i ∈ T−i, there exists a unique t∗i ∈ Ti such that π(t∗i , t−i) > 0.
NEI means that the pooled information of any n− 1 agents uniquely determines the
profile of types.
Corollary 9 If the agents in the economy have NEI, then an IIE mechanism exists.
In addition, agents are indifferent between any two IIE mechanisms. In particular, if
Ui(·|ti) is strictly concave for each i ∈ N and each ti ∈ Ti, then there exists a unique IIE
mechanism.10
10See footnote 9.
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Proof. The corollary directly follows from Proposition 6 after showing that its assump-
tion is satisfied. Let thus a be any feasible allocation rule. Let then μ be the mechanism
defined as follows: μ(t) = a(t) for all t ∈ Tˆ and μ(t) = min?t∈Tˆ μ(bt) for all t /∈ Tˆ . If all
agents report truthfully, then no agent can gain by deviating from reporting his true type
since, by NEI, any deviation will yield a type profile that does not belong to Tˆ , and result
in receiving a smaller or equal bundle. Hence, the mechanism μ is incentive feasible. By
construction, we also have Ui(μ|ti) = Ui(a|ti), for all ti ∈ Ti and all i ∈ N , as desired.
There are other instances that have been discussed in the literature where incentive
constraints can be circumvented. It should be clear that Proposition 6 would apply in
those cases as well, even though we will not phrase these results formally here, because
they require slightly different frameworks. For instance, there are environments where the
true state of the world is commonly known at the time of implementing the agreements.11
In such cases, incentive constraints are irrelevant, and yet information is relevant at the
time of selecting an agreement. As an illustration, the payment of an insurance contract
depends on the observable losses incurred, or the payment of a financial asset (e.g. equities
or options) is contingent on the realization of some observable events. There are more
general situations where Proposition 6 or a variant may apply. For instance, Riordan
and Sappington (1988) showed how a public ex post signal that is correlated with agents’
types may render the initial information asymmetry inconsequential.
The existence result in Proposition 6 might not seem surprising at first sight given
Pazner and Schmeidler’s (1978) existence result under complete information, and given
that incentive constraints are assumed not to be restricting what the social planner or the
society as a whole can implement. Even so, asymmetric information plays a significant
role in the definition of our notion of equity, and this is what makes the existence result
interesting and more challenging to prove than in the special case of complete information.
Also, the result comes in contrast to previous results on fair allocations. Fairness is
another classical ordinal notion of equity for exchange economies that combines efficiency
with envy-freeness (see Foley, 1967, and Varian, 1974). Fair allocations are known to
exist in well-behaved exchange economies (e.g. the competitive equilibrium with equal
income leads to a fair allocation). de Clippel (2008) proposed a natural extension of these
definitions to problems that involve asymmetric information, and showed that interim
envy-freeness may be incompatible with interim incentive efficiency, even if incentive
constraints can be overlooked.12
11That assumption was used for instance by Wilson (1978) and more recently by de Clippel (2007)
(see also references therein) in their study of the core under incomplete information, and by de Clippel
and Minelli (2004) in their study of bargaining under incomplete information.
12The example from de Clippel (2008) does not immediately fit the model of the present paper, because
it was written under the assumption that the true state of the world is commonly known at the time of
implementing the agreements. Also, the aggregate amount of money to be shared was changing with the
state of the world. It is easy, though, to construct a similar example with NEI that would fit our current
framework. In that example, an IIE mechanism exists (as predicted by Proposition 6), while interim
envy-freeness and interim incentive efficiency are incompatible. Details are available upon request from
the authors.
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Existence of interim equitable mechanisms is no longer guaranteed when incentive
constraints are truly restricting the set of allocation rules that can be implemented. The
next section provides an economic example where an IIE mechanism may fail to exist.
5 An Economic Example
This section provides an economic example, where we first characterize the IIE mech-
anisms in a context of non-exclusive information, and then show that the set of IIE
mechanisms may be empty with a modified information structure where some agent has
exclusive information.
There are two commodities — money and another consumption good. The aggregate
amounts available to share are M and Q, respectively. There are three agents, 1, 2 and
3. Agent 1 has no private information, and hence has only one possible type, T1 = {∗},
while both agents 2 and 3 have two possible types, T2 = T3 = {L,H}, with π(∗, L,H) =
π(∗, H, L) = 0, π(∗, L, L) = p, and π(∗,H,H) = 1 − p. For instance, there are two
possible states of nature (representing, say, the intrinsic quality of the consumption good
to be shared), low and high, and while both agents 2 and 3 know which state prevails,
agent 1 is uncertain about it. This environment clearly satisfies the NEI assumption.
The preferences of the agents are given by:
Types e(.) u1((q,m), .) u2((q,m), .) u3((q,m), .)
(∗, L, L) (Q,M) m1 + 2
√
q1 m2 + vLq2 m3
(∗, H,H) (Q,M) m1 + 2
√
q1 m2 + vHq2 m3
wheremi denotes the amount of money assigned to agent i, qi is the quantity he consumes
of the other good, and vL, vH , with 0 < vL < vH , are two exogenous parameters. To avoid
the complication of corner solutions, we will assume throughout the section that Q ≥ 1v2L .
The interim utilities associated with incentive compatible mechanisms depend only
on the allocation they prescribe in the type profiles (∗, L, L) and (∗,H,H), since the
two other type profiles come with zero probability. Corollary 9 implies that any feasible
allocation rule can be implemented through an incentive compatible mechanism. Hence
our problem amounts to finding vectors (qit,mit), i = 1, 2, 3 and t ∈ {L,H}, such thatP3
i=1 qit ≤ Q and
P3
i=1mit ≤M , for each t ∈ {L,H}. Ex-post efficiency requires
q1t =
1
v2t
, q2t = Q−
1
v2t
, q3t = 0, and
3X
i=1
mit =M for t = H,L. (1)
Utilities being quasi-linear, there is no room for mutually beneficial insurance, and hence
the conditions in (1) are also necessary and sufficient for interim incentive efficiency in
this simple example.
Using (1), interim incentive equitability along the direction d = (M,Q) is character-
ized by
P3
i=1mit = M , for t = H,L, and the existence of λ such that the following five
equations hold:
U1(·|∗) = p
∙
m1L +
2
vL
¸
+ (1− p)
∙
m1H +
2
vH
¸
= λM + 2
p
λQ, (2)
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U2(·|L) = m2L + vLQ− 1vL = λM + vLλQ, (3)
U2(·|H) = m2H + vHQ− 1vH = λM + vHλQ. (4)
U3(·|L) = m3L = λM, (5)
U3(·|H) = m3H = λM. (6)
The sum of (2), p-times (3) and (5) and (1 − p)-times (4) and (6) gives (remember
that m1t +m2t +m3t =M , for t = H,L):
M + p
∙
1
vL
+ vLQ
¸
+ (1− p)
∙
1
vH
+ vHQ
¸
= 2
p
Q
√
λ+ (3M + [pvL + (1− p)vH ]Q)λ,
(7)
which is a second-degree equation in
√
λ. Its unique positive root determines the unique
IIE mechanism.
Suppose now that agent 3 is also uninformed. Hence, NEI is violated, agent 2 has
“real” private information and may decide not to truthfully report it, if it is in his interest
to do so. Formally, agent 3 has now only one possible type, T3 = {∗}, and utility functions
are given in the following table:
Types e(.) u1(., .) u2((q,m), .) u3((q,m), .)
(∗, L, ∗) (Q,M) m1 + 2
√
q1 m2 + vLq2 m3
(∗, H, ∗) (Q,M) m1 + 2
√
q1 m2 + vHq2 m3
A mechanism is a function that associates vectors (qit,mit) (i = 1, 2, 3), to each report
t ∈ {L,H} from agent 2.
We show in Appendix 1 that the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms is the
union of the three following regions:
Region 1
q1H =
1
v2H
, q1L =
1
v2L
, and
any allocation of money satisfying m2L −m2H ∈
∙
1
vL
− vL
v2H
,
vH
v2L
− 1
vH
¸
.
Region 2
q1H =
1
v2H
,
any q1L ≥ 1v2L if vL ≤ (1− p)vH
any q1L ∈
h
1
v2L
, p
2
(vL−(1−p)vH)2
i
if vL > (1− p)vH
, and
any allocation of money satisfying m2L −m2H = vH
µ
q1L −
1
v2H
¶
.
Region 3
any q1H ∈
∙
(1− p)2
(vH − pvL)2
,
1
v2H
¸
, q1L =
1
v2L
, and
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any allocation of money satisfying m2L −m2H = vL
µ
1
v2L
− q1H
¶
.
We now observe that IIE mechanisms may fail to exist, for instance when vL = 1,
vH = 2, p = 3/4, Q = 12, M = 20, and d = (M,Q). Egalitarian equivalence requires
m1t +m2t +m3t = 20 for t = H,L and:
0.25(m1H + 2
√
q1H) + 0.75(m1L + 2
√
q1L) = 20λ+ 2
√
12λ (8)
m2H + 2(12− q1H) = 44λ (9)
m2L + (12− q1L) = 32λ (10)
0.25m3H + 0.75m3L = 20λ (11)
We first note that the sum of (8), 0.25 times (9), 0.75 times (10) and (11) gives:
0.5
√
q1H + 1.5
√
q1L − 0.5q1H − 0.75q1L + 35 = 75λ+ 4
√
3
√
λ. (12)
We now proceed by examining the possible regions. In Region 1, q1H = 0.25 and q1L = 1.
Then, equation (12) yields λ = 0.4379 and substracting (9) from (10) gives m2L−m2H =
7.2452, which violates the upper-bound vHv2L −
1
vH
= 1.5. In Region 2, q1H = 0.25 and
m2L − m2H = 2q1L − 0.5. Substracting (9) from (10) gives q1L = 12 − 12λ. Then,
substituting this into (12) yields λ = .4128 which implies q1L = 7.0461, violating the
upper-bound p
2
(vL−(1−p)vH)2
= 2.25. Finally, in Region 3, q1L = 1 andm2L−m2H = 1−q1H .
From (9) and (10) we obtain q1H = 12−12λ and, substituting into (12) yields λ = .4069,
hence q1H = 7.1170, which again violates the upper-bound 1v2H = 0.25.
There are of course several other instances where interim incentive equitable mecha-
nisms exist. In Appendix 2 we show that, if vL ≤ (1− p)vH and Q is large enough, there
always exists an interim incentive equitable mechanism; it lies in Region 2.
Hence moving from fairness to egalitarian equivalence while consistent with efficiency
in NEI environments may clash with interim efficiency once incentive constraints are
relevant. Equity considerations have faced the same problem in economic environments:
equality may be incompatible with efficiency (see Pazner and Schmeidler, 1974, and
Maniquet, 1999).
6 Concluding Discussion
We start by discussing some additional properties of the interim equitable solution that
associates with each economy the set of mechanisms that are interim incentive equitable.
First, the proposal is invariant to affine transformations of the interim utilities, i.e. chang-
ing the utility function ui of any agent i ∈ N in t by multiplying it with a strictly positive
coefficient that may vary with ti and/or adding a real number that may vary with ti, does
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not affect the solution. Second, the interim equitable solution satisfies Myerson’s (1984)
probability invariance axiom, since it depends on the probabilities only through the com-
putation of interim utilities. One could even have considered a more general framework
with the agents’ ordinal interim preferences as exogenous variables (allowing, for instance,
for non-expected utility), instead of deriving those from the expected utility criterion ap-
plied to ex-post utilities. Indeed, both interim incentive efficiency and interim egalitarian
equivalence depend only on those interim preferences, and the interim equitable solution
is then ordinally invariant in this more general framework. Third, the interim equitable
solution is anonymous, meaning that renaming the agents, or even their types, will not
change their payoffs. Fourth, the solution is also monotonic, meaning that increasing
the total endowment e cannot make any agent of any type worse off (assuming that d
does not vary with e). Fifth, we can also offer a weak comparison of the level of interim
satisfaction achieved at mechanisms in the interim equitable solution and the level of
satisfaction achieved for egalitarian equivalent allocations in the ex-post economies. Let
λ∗(t) be the level reached at any Pareto efficient and egalitarian equivalent allocation, in
the ex-post economy obtained should t be realized. Let λ∗(E) be the level reached by any
mechanism in the solution on the minimal common knowledge event E. If π satisfies the
NEI condition, then λ∗(E) ≥ mint∈Tˆ∩E λ∗(t) for each minimal common knowledge event
E. Notice that the inequality is most often strict, because of the possibility of mutually
beneficial insurance. On the other hand, the inequality does not extend to economies
that do not satisfy NEI, because the incentive constraints can be so severe that it is
impossible to guarantee even the minimum of the ex-post levels.
As we have shown through an economic example, interim equitable solutions may not
exist when the incentive constraints truly restrict the set of allocation rules that can be
implemented. When there is tension between efficiency and equity, a common remedy is
to look for allocations (or mechanisms in our case) that minimize the largest deviation
from equality. To avoid multiplicity, a natural lexicographic refinement is often applied.
We can follow the same path and, for any mechanism μ, define the vector ∆λμ as a
vector whose components are
¯¯
λμj (tj)− λ
μ
i (ti)
¯¯
for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, all ti ∈ Ti, and all
tj ∈ Tj. Let α be the function that associates with each vector of real numbers the vector
obtained by ordering its components decreasingly. Then, an interim incentive efficient
mechanism μ is said to be weakly interim equitable if it minimizes α(∆λμ) according to
the lexicographic ordering over the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms. The set
of weakly interim equitable mechanisms is always non-empty.
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Appendix 1: Characterization of Interim Incentive Efficiency for the Econ-
omy in Section 5
We characterize the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms through a serie of claims.
First, notice that the two incentive constraints are:
m2H + vHq2H ≥ m2L + vHq2L, (13)
m2L + vLq2L ≥ m2H + vLq2H . (14)
Claim 1 Interim incentive efficiency implies q1H ≤ 1v2H . In addition, q1H =
1
v2H
if (14) is
not binding.
Proof. Indeed, from any mechanism, change q2H (resp. q1H) by a small +δ (resp. −δ)
and simultaneously change m2H (resp. m1H) by an amount −δvH (resp. +δvH). The
utility obtained by both types of agent 2 and constraint (13) do not change. Constraint
(14) is relaxed if δ > 0. Finally, agent 1’s utility level increases with the change when
δ > 0 and q1H > 1v2H or when δ < 0 and q1H <
1
v2H
. Therefore, q1H > 1v2H cannot be part
of an IIE mechanism. Also, q1H < 1v2H cannot be part of an IIE mechanism if (14) is not
binding.
Claim 2 Interim incentive efficiency implies q1L ≥ 1v2L . In addition, q1L =
1
v2L
if (13) is
not binding.
Proof. Similarly as before, from any allocation, change q2L (resp. q1L) by a small +δ
(resp. −δ) and simultaneously changem2L (resp. m1L) by an amount −δvL (resp. +δvL).
Agent 2’s utility and constraint (14) do not change. Constraint (13) is relaxed if δ < 0.
Agent 1’s utility increases when δ < 0 and q1L < 1v2L or when δ > 0 and q1L >
1
v2L
.
Claim 3 Both incentive constraints (13) and (14) can not bind simultaneously at an
interim incentive efficient mechanism.
Proof. From Claims 1 and 2, q1L ≥ 1v2L >
1
v2H
≥ q1H . If (13) and (14) were both to hold
with equality, then q1L = q1H , and one would reach a contradiction.
Claim 4 Interim incentive efficiency implies q3L = q3H = 0.
Proof. The proof is immediate given that agent 3 derives no utility from q.
We now analyze the three possible regions where interim incentive efficient mecha-
nisms can lie: no binding incentive constraints, or only one binding constraint. To the
equations identifying the interim incentive efficient mechanisms below, we always have
to add the obvious requirements q1t + q2t = Q and m1t +m2t +m3t =M for t = H,L.
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Claim 5 In Region 1, where no incentive constraint is binding, the IIE allocations are
characterized by:
q1H =
1
v2H
, q1L =
1
v2L
, and
any allocation of money satisfying m2L −m2H ∈
∙
1
vL
− vL
v2H
,
vH
v2L
− 1
vH
¸
.
Proof. The allocations must be ex-post Pareto efficient if incentive constraints are not
relevant, while the condition on m2L − m2H rewrites the constraints (13) and (14) for
those values of q1H and q1L.
Claim 6 In Region 2, where constraint (13) is binding, the IIE allocations are charac-
terized by:
(a) If vL ≤ (1− p)vH
q1H =
1
v2H
, any q1L ≥
1
v2L
,
any allocation of money that involves m2L −m2H = vH
µ
q1L −
1
v2H
¶
.
(b) If vL > (1− p)vH, same conditions as in (a) except that q1L ∈
h
1
v2L
, p
2
(vL−(1−p)vH)2
i
.
Proof. To show that, we recall that the utility levels achieved by any interim incentive
efficient allocation in Region 2 must satisfy, in addition to the resource constraints, q1t+
q2t = Q and m1t +m2t +m3t =M for t = H,L, the following 6 equations:
u1 = pm1L + 2p
√
q1L + (1− p)m1H + 2(1− p)
√
q1H
u2H = m2H + vHq2H
u2L = m2L + vLq2L
u3 = pm3L + (1− p)m3H
m2H + vHq2H = m2L + vHq2L
m2L + vLq2L > m2H + vLq2H
Using the resource constraints we obtain:
u1 = p(M −m2L−m3L) + 2p
p
Q− q2L+ (1− p)(M −m2H −m3H) + 2(1− p)
p
Q− q2H
and finally:
u1 = p(M −m2L) + 2p
p
Q− q2L + (1− p)(M −m2H)− u3 + 2(1− p)
p
Q− q2H
Thus, we get the following 6 equations:
u1 = p(M −m2L) + 2p
p
Q− q2L + (1− p)(M −m2H)− u3 + 2(1− p)
p
Q− q2H
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u2H = m2H + vHq2H
u2L = m2L + vLq2L
u3 = pm3L + (1− p)m3H
m2H + vHq2H = m2L + vHq2L
m2L + vLq2L > m2H + vLq2H
Interim incentive efficiency implies that q1H = (1/vH)
2 and (1/vL)
2 ≤ q1L. Also note
that one cannot obtain a Pareto improvement by just changing the m allocation, neither
can an improvement be realized by changing q1H or by increasing q1L. So in order to
characterize interim incentive efficient allocations we need to determine the conditions
under which a decrease in q1L, which amounts to an increase in q2L, cannot lead to a
Pareto improvement either. Increasing q2L by δ > 0 and decreasing m2L by δvL leaves
both types of agent 2 as well as agent 3 with the same utility level and does not violate the
incentive constraint for agent 2 of type L. It does, however cause the incentive constraint
for agent 2 of type H to be violated, since the RHS increases by −δvL + δvH . To offset
that increase, the utility of agent 2 of type H must be increased by at least the same
amount, and since we want to maximize the gain of agent 1, it should be increased by
−δvL + δvH . The efficient way to realize that raise is to increase m2H by −δvL + δvH
(since efficiency in this region requires q1H = (1/vH)
2). All these changes alter u1 by
du1 = δpvL− δp√Q−q2L − (1−p)δ(vH−vL) . If the initial allocation was efficient, the utility
of agent 1 must decrease. Thus it must be that:
δpvL −
δp√
Q− q2L
− (1− p)δ(vH − vL) ≤ 0
or p√
Q− q2L
≥ −(vH − vL) + pvH = vL − (1− p)vH
which holds for any q2L (thus any q1L) if vL ≤ (1− p)vH .
If vL > (1−p)vH , this change will not lead to an improvement if p
2
q1L
≥ (vL + (p− 1)vH)2
or q1L ≤ P
2
(vL+(p−1)vH)2
(note that the LHS is indeed greater than 1v2L
).
To conclude note that the requirement m2L −m2H = vH
³
q1L − 1v2H
´
rewrites (using
the resource constraint) the incentive constraint for agent 2 of type H.
Claim 7 In Region 3, where constraint (14) is binding, the IIE allocations are charac-
terized by:
any q1H ∈
∙
(1− p)2
(vH − pvL)2
,
1
v2H
¸
, q1L =
1
v2L
, and
any allocation of money that involves m2L −m2H = vL
µ
1
v2L
− q1H
¶
.
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Proof. Proceeding as in the previous proof we get that the utility levels achieved by any
interim incentive efficient allocation in Region 3 must satisfy:
u1 = p(M −m2L) + 2p
p
Q− q2L + (1− p)(M −m2H)− u3 + 2(1− p)
p
Q− q2H
u2H = m2H + vHq2H
u2L = m2L + vLq2L
u3 = pm3L + (1− p)m3H
m2H + vHq2H > m2L + vHq2L
m2L + vLq2L = m2H + vLq2H
Interim incentive efficiency implies that q1H ≤ (1/vH)2 and q1L = (1/vL)2. Similar to
before we need to show that a decrease in q2H cannot lead to a Pareto improvement . To
that effect we decrease q2H by δ > 0, increasing m2H by δvH . Similar to before this leads
to a violation of the incentive constraint for agent 2 of type L. The RHS of the constraint
increases by −δvL + δvH . The "best" way to restore the constraint is to increase m2L by
δ(vH − vL). These changes alter u1 by du1 = −pδ(vH − vL)− (1− p)δvH + δ(1−p)√Q−q2H . If the
initial allocation was efficient, the utility of agent 1 must decrease. It must be the case
then that
−pδ(vH − vL)− (1− p)δvH +
δ(1− p)√
Q− q2H
≤ 0
or
−pδ(vH − vL)− (1− p)δvH +
δ(1− p)√
Q− q2H
or
(1− p)√
Q− q2H
≤ p(vH − vL) + (1− p)vH = vH − pvL
which holds since we are in the region where q1H ≥ (1−p)
2
(vH−pvL)2
(note that the RHS is indeed
smaller than 1v2H
).
To conclude note that the requirement m2L −m2H = vL
³
1
v2L
− q1H
´
rewrites (using
the resource constraint) the incentive constraint for agent 2 of type L.
7 Appendix 2
We prove that, if vL ≤ (1− p)vH and Q is large enough, there always exists an interim
equitable mechanism; it lies in Region 2. Indeed, an interim incentive efficient mechanism
is also interim equitable if there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
pm1L + 2p
√
q1L + (1− p)m1H + 2(1− p)
√
q1H = λM + 2
p
λQ. (15)
m2H + vH (Q− q1H) = λ (M + vHQ) (16)
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m2L + vL (Q− q1L) = λ (M + vLQ) (17)
pm3L + (1− p)m3H = λM (18)
Substracting (16) from (17), and recalling that in Region 2, q1H = 1v2H and m2L −m2H =
vH
³
q1L − 1v2H
´
, we obtain that λ = 1− q1LQ . Also, adding up equations (15), (1−p) times
(16), p times (17), and (18), we get:
M+2p
√
q1L+(1−p)
1
vH
+pvL (Q− q1L)+(1−p)vHQ = (3M + pvLQ+ (1− p)vHQ)λ+2
p
λQ
Substituting λ in the previous expression, we obtain:
2p
√
q1L + (1− p)
1
vH
= 2M − q1L
µ
3M
Q
+ (1− p)vH
¶
+ 2
p
(Q− q1L)
i.e.,
f(q1L) ≡ 2M − q1L
µ
3M
Q
+ (1− p)vH
¶
+ 2
p
(Q− q1L)− 2p
√
q1L − (1− p)
1
vH
= 0.
Notice that f 0(q1L) < 0 and
f(q1L =
1
v2L
) ≡ 2M − 1
v2L
µ
3M
Q
+ (1− p)vH
¶
+ 2
s
(Q− 1
v2L
)− 2p
s
1
v2L
− (1− p) 1
vH
> 0
if Q is large. Finally
f(q1L = Q) = −M − (1− p)vHQ− 2p
p
Q− (1− p) 1
vH
< 0.
Therefore, there exists a unique q1L ∈
³
1
v2L
, Q
´
for which f(q1L) = 0 which we denote by
q∗. For q1L = q∗ and q1H = 1v2H , and for any value of m3H , the following values for the
other variables satisfy equations (15) to (18), and all the feasibility constraints, as well
as the efficiency requirements:
λ = 1− q1LQ , q2L = Q− q∗, q3L = 0, q2H = Q−
1
v2H
, q3H = 0
m1L = 1+pp
q1L
Q M−
1
pM+
1−p
p m3H , m2L =M−
q1L
Q M, m3L =
1
pM−
1
p
q1L
Q M−
1−p
p m3H ,
m1H =M q1LQ + q1LvH −
1
vH
−m3H , m2H =M(1− q1LQ )− q1LvH +
1
vH
Hence the previous mechanism is IIE.
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